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Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a rapid growth in a large range of investment managers that 
represent alternatives to traditional equity holding in listed corporations by individuals and 
institutions such as pension funds and insurance. These alternative investors include private 
equity, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, infrastructure funds, etc. These trends have 
important implications for the management and governance of firms that have to date 
received varied attention. In particular, the changing investor landscape raises critical 
research questions regarding the structures and processes of shareholder engagement with 
portfolio companies. However, the extent to which alternative investors represent new forms 
of engagement and governance that cover all stages of firms’ life-cycle is as yet unclear 
(Wright, Siegel, Keasey and Filatotchev, 2013). The returns from some forms of alternative 
investors, notably private equity firms, have attracted other forms of entrants to the market 
such as hedge funds which may have different skills, different objectives and different 
investment time horizons. Similarly, the entry of sovereign wealth funds raises further issues 
and concerns about their strategic objectives and the implications for their portfolio 
companies. 
 
The increase in the range and diversity of these investment institutions also raises direct 
questions about the extent to which the regulatory authorities are capable of dealing with the 
challenges that these new investment vehicles pose in terms of their involvement in corporate 
governance. Developments in the presence and roles of alternative investors have generated 
considerable policy debate and have led to actions to change the regulatory framework 
covering these organizations. The evidence base for these developments is partial at best and 
the appropriately differentiated regulatory approaches continue to attract attention. 
 
The Centre for Research on Corporate Governance at Cass Business School, City University 
London jointly with the Journal of Management and Governance organized a conference in 
London in September 2011 that aimed to address these gaps in the evidence concerning the 
structures and processes through which governance and management are effected in firms 
with these new types of investors, and how these alternative investment firms are regulated. 
This Conference brought together academics, practitioners and regulators involved in 
research and policy development related to the changes in investor landscape in the UK and 
abroad. Apart from members of the research community, the audience included fund 
managers and their advisors, corporate governance practitioners and Government. 
 
Academic papers presented at the Conference form the basis for this Special Issue and they 
cover a wide range of topics, research methodologies and empirical data. The paper by 
Muller-Kahle examines the impact of three types of dominant shareholders on firm 
performance.  Using a longitudinal sample of firms in the US and UK, findings show that 
firm performance is negatively influenced by CEO dominant owners.   Furthermore, firms 
with dominant owners who have no existing business relationships with the  firms have better 
firm performance than firms with dominant owners who have potential conflicts of interest. 
 
 Faelten, Gietzmann and Vitkova develop a financial geography framework and 
analyze the impact of institutional information on the probability of a takeover being 
completed as well as on the post-takeover performance. Their research context is foreign 
M&A and the role of changes in shareholding by institutional owners. It is hypothesised that 
regional expertise, that is, local knowledge, provides additional information to a potential 
acquirer. Therefore the key contribution of their paper is to test the relationship between low 
investor share turnover by institutions with local expertise and the probability of a deal 
occurring. It is also hypothesised that these deals will produce higher post merger returns.  
 
Croci and Pertrella exploit blockholders’ legal filing requirements with the Italian 
regulatory authority (CONSOB) to examine trading and disclosure effects associated with 
hedge fund trades. Trading effects are related to hedge funds’ buying activity on the market, 
whereas disclosure effects are related to the possibility that the market anticipates future 
activism and reacts to the announcement of hedge funds’ ownership. The authors find that the 
trading effect is significantly larger than the disclosure effect. This result implies that the 
price impact associated with hedge fund purchases explains a large portion of the price 
reaction attributed exclusively to hedge fund activism in previous studies.  
 
Weir, Jones and Wright are focused on the effects of private equity firms in public-
to-private (PTP) transactions in the UK. Using a hand collected data set of 138 buy-outs, 
these authors show that for all PTPs there is a significant improvement in financial health in 
the post deal years relative to the year before going private. They also find that there is a 
significant improvement in the financial health of PTPs relative to firms remaining public. 
However, they suggest that the claims that the financial and governance mechanisms imposed 
by PE providers will produce better outcomes are strictly limited in the second wave of PTPs.  
 
Finally, considering the recent rapid expansion of shareholder activism phenomenon 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and the vast amount of resources committed to it by 
corporations, government and investors, Filatotchev and Dotsenko investigate its 
effectiveness.  This article analyzes organizational outcomes of shareholder activism in the 
UK. The authors provide a detailed account of different types of activists, activism strategies 
and shareholder demands associated with the events of activism. Their findings show that the 
effectiveness of shareholder activism in terms of abnormal stock-market returns varies 
dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and the nature of investor proposals. 
 
It would be hard to provide a parsimonious account of a rapidly developing sub-field 
of corporate governance research that is focused on the complex interaction between 
organizations and their investors, although the papers in this Special Issue address some 
important aspects of investor engagement and ifferent types of investors. Other questions that 
future research might address include the following: 
  How are board members selected in firms with alternative investors and what is their 
involvement in firm governance?  How do the structures and processes of governance by alternative investors vary across 
different institutional contexts?  How do the structures and processes of governance by alternative investors vary 
according to whether they are domestic or foreign investors in a particular country? 
 How do different governance and management approaches of alternative investors pose 
challenges for the transition from one investor to another as firms pass through 
development phases?  To what extent do different alternative investors encourage managers to pursue growth 
versus restructuring strategies?  What are the time horizons of different alternative investors and how do these influence 
approaches to governance and management in portfolio companies? 
 
We hope that researchers will be inspired by this Special Issue when addressing some of the 
aforementioned research questions. 
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